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ABSTRACT
We study the association between auditor reappointment (initial relationship stage), including recurring auditor 
appointment over several consecutive years (close relationship stage) and company engagement in related-party 
transactions (RPTs) for selected listed companies from Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.  The results show 
that auditor reappointment has significant and negative associations with company engagement in RPTs. By contrast, 
the close ACR relationship increases company engagement in RPTs. The evidence also suggests that Big 4 audit firms can 
reduce company engagement in RPTs, even when they have a close relationship. However, the findings derived from a 
sub-sample of RPT companies suggest that the close relationship between Big 4 audit firms and their clients substantially 
encourages companies to engage in RPTs. Overall, these findings are consistent with theories in which higher audit quality 
is effective at monitoring RPTs, but the established relationship looks likely to create conflicting opinions that impair 
auditors’ independent judgment. Nevertheless, the likelihood of conflict disappears when clients operate in countries 
that more effectively implement and enforce regulations and protect minority shareholders.
Keywords: Auditor-client relationship; auditor tenure; auditor reappointment; related party transactions; audit 
independence
ABSTRAK
Kami mengkaji hubungan antara pelantikan semula juruaudit (peringkat awal hubungan), termasuk pelantikan semula 
secara berulang untuk beberapa tahun yang berturutan (peringkat hubungan yang rapat) dan penglibatan syarikat dalam 
urus niaga pihak berkaitan (UPB) bagi syarikat tersenarai terpilih dari Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapura dan Thailand. 
Keputusan menunjukkan bahawa pelantikan semula juruaudit (peringkat awal hubungan) mempunyai hubungan yang 
negatif dan signifikan dengan penglibatan syarikat dalam UPB. Sebaliknya, pelantikan semula juruaudit di peringkat 
hubungan yang akrab meningkatkan penglibatan syarikat dalam UPB. Bukti juga mengesyorkan bahawa firma audit “Big 
4” boleh mengurangkan penglibatan syarikat dalam UPB, walaupun mempunyai hubungan yang rapat dengan pengurus. 
Namun, penemuan yang diperoleh daripada sub-sampel syarikat UPB sahaja mencadangkan bahawa firma audit “Big 
4” yang mempunyai hubungan rapat dengan pihak pengurusan meningkatkan penglibatan syarikat dalam UPB dengan 
signifikan. Secara keseluruhan, penemuan kajian ini adalah konsisten dengan teori, kualiti audit yang tinggi efektif dalam 
memantau UPB. Tetapi, hubungan yang rapat antara juruaudit dan pengurus menyebabkan konflik yang boleh menjejaskan 
pertimbangan yang bebas. Namun demikian, kemungkinan berlakunya konflik akan lenyap apabila syarikat beroperasi 
dalam negara yang melaksanakan peraturan dan perlindungan yang efektif kepada pemegang saham minoriti.
Keywords: Hubungan juruaudit-klien; tenur juruaudit; pelantikan semula juruaudit; urusniaga pihak berkaitan; 
kebebasan audit
INTRODUCTION
The reappointment of the same audit firm over a long-
tenure auditor-client relationship (ACR) has been subject 
to considerable debate and criticism for many years, over 
more than a decade (Goodwin 2002; Kleinman & Palmon 
2001) in which the close ACR (established network) 
could impair auditor’s independent judgment (Beattie 
& Fearnley 1998; Beattie, Fearnley & Brandt 2004; 
Schmidt & Cross 2014), particularly after a revelation 
of Enron accounting scandals. However, audit firms and 
auditor’s rotation policy in majority jurisdictions over the 
world has never changed much, including in East Asia 
countries. Prior studies found mixed evidence to show 
a prevailing negative impact of close ACR. Instead of 
auditor’s monitoring role in agency conflict as covered in 
most prior studies (Gallery, Gallery & Supranowicz 2008; 
Myers, Myers & Omer 2003), this study integrates the 
close ACR from the networking perspective. Close ACR’s 
literatures e.g. (Beattie et al. 2004; Schmidt & Cross 2014) 
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suggest that clients (hereafter managers) gain a larger scale 
of advantages than auditors. Thus, this study argues that 
managers’ decision to reappoint the same auditors for 
subsequent audit engagements are influenced by many 
factors (e.g., they may believe in the trustworthiness, 
service quality and reputation of a service provider 
in sharing advantages and others) in order to achieve 
certain goals, including a sustainable competitiveness or 
opportunity advantages (Chowdhury 2012). 
Managers typically focus on degrees of chemistry in 
their personal relationships prior to selecting a suitable 
auditor for a company (Beattie & Fearnley 1998) in 
which managers prefer to appoint auditors from their 
personal contacts or networks (Beattie et al. 2004). This 
study employs managers’ engagement in related-party 
transactions (RPTs) as a potential incentive that derive them 
to reappoint the same auditors over many consecutive 
years in order to gain benefits from the established close 
network. The study was motivated by Gordon, Henry, 
Louwers, and Reed (2007) who highlight that companies 
engaging in RPTs prefer to appoint auditors with whom 
they have a sense of chemistry, established through 
networking or past experiences. Nevertheless, Gordon et 
al.’s (2007) argument is not empirically proven to date, 
thus crucially motivating the present study to explore the 
predicted relationship. 
ACRs are formal business relationships, and established 
networks can benefit one another (de-Ruyter & Wetzels 
1999). A recurring appointment of the same auditor over 
several consecutive years can promote a stronger sense of 
mutual understanding and can ultimately establish close 
networks between managers and their auditors (Chowdhury 
2012). While managers can use their close networks to 
increase their companies’ operational efficiency levels, 
opportunistic managers may utilize close networks for 
personal gains (Hawkins, Knipper & Strutton 2009). 
Therefore, managers may reappoint the same auditors 
over several consecutive years to benefit opportunistic 
advantages from close relationships, including to engage 
in RPTs. We predict that close ACRs increases number 
and magnitude of RPTs. Although close relationships 
can enhance an auditor’s efficiency, the auditor can be 
trapped into conflict of interest scenario (Dao & Pham 
2014; Meyer, Rigsby & Boone 2007). If the auditors (who 
are supposed to play the role of independent external 
control mechanism) are appointed among managers’ close 
networks, managers engagement in RPTs may cause harm 
to minority shareholders’ wealth.
The auditor is responsible for monitoring and 
ensuring that RPTs are conducted honestly and disclosed 
properly. Nevertheless, as several of the accounting 
scandals that have occurred over the recent decade 
have involved RPTs, market participants have criticized 
auditors’ capacities to maintain independence in auditor-
manager conflict situations. This main concern is aligned 
with Shockley (1982), who stated that longstanding ACRs 
promote complacency, lacking innovation, less rigorous 
audit procedures and learned confidence. Schmidt and 
Cross (2014) also emphasized that manager demands 
and negotiation strategies would be changed throughout 
the relationship, which are more pronounced than those 
of auditors in long tenure ACR. Thus, managers may 
manipulate close ACR advantages to engage in abusive 
RPTs, as they have access to auditors’ preferences.
Therefore, the main objective of our study is to 
examine the association between auditor reappointment 
and a company’s engagement in RPTs during two different 
stages: initial or close stages of relationship. We define 
the initial relationship stage as a reappointment of the 
same audit firm for a subsequent to the first-year audit 
engagement. At this stage, the ACR is considered new 
and fragile, and any disagreement or conflict between 
both parties can end the relationship easily. By contrast, 
we define the close relationship stage as an actual tenure 
of repeated auditor appointment over several consecutive 
years for the audit engagement. At the close stage, 
commitment between both is strong (Beattie et al. 2004) 
and negotiation strategies can also change from the initial 
stage (Schmidt & Cross 2014).
Another objective of this study is to investigate the 
association between recurring auditor appointment among 
Big 4 audit firms and company engagement in RPTs. We 
extend cross-sectional studies conducted by Gallery 
et al. (2008) and by Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010), which 
suggest that Big 4 audit firms can minimize company 
engagement in RPTs, can reduce numbers of RPTs and 
transform RPTs with potential for conflict in facilitating 
efficient transactions. However, we argue that the use of 
audit firm size (either by Big 4 or non-Big 4 firms) may 
not sufficiently reflect close relationships found by Gordon 
et al. (2007). Can the same Big 4 audit firms withstand 
independence when firms are reappointed repeatedly over 
several consecutive years? 
RPTs are prominent among companies in many East 
Asian countries due to company concentrated ownership 
structures and business landscapes that encourage 
companies to conduct business with related parties 
(Claessens, Djankov & Lang 2000; Munir, Mohd-Saleh, 
Jaffar & Yatim 2013). While corporate governance and 
regulatory reforms have been extensively implemented in 
these four countries since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, 
auditor rotation policies have remained unchanged. We 
use a sample that consists of 1,269 observations derived 
from 421 listed companies from Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand within three years. The results 
suggest that initial ACR stage significantly reduce company 
dealings with related parties. Managers may behave 
less aggressively as they require ample time to become 
more familiar with auditors and prefer to cooperate with 
auditors (Schmidt & Cross 2014). However, the results 
show the relationship change drastically, the magnitude 
of RPTs increases along with the number of years auditors 
are consecutively reappointed. These findings confirm 
that managers may reappoint the same auditors over 
several consecutive years in order to conduct RPTs by 
manipulating the advantages of close relationships. The 
Artkl 4 (48) (Dis 2016).indd   48 31/01/2017   16:00:09
49Do Managers Reappoint Auditor for Related Party Transactions? Evidence from Selected East Asian Countries
evidence is robust when the test is conducted strictly by 
excluding companies that do not disclose RPTs. Generally, 
the Big 4 audit firms play an efficient role to reduce the 
magnitude of RPTs, although they are reappointed over 
several consecutive years. However, the ability of the 
Big 4 audit firms to withstand independence on long ACR 
is impaired when the test is repeated on a sample of RPTs 
companies. 
This cross-country analysis contributes to the 
existing literature at a broader international perspective 
involving four selected East Asian countries. We pioneer 
in contributing evidence of the association between auditor 
reappointment and company engagement in RPTs. The 
auditor reappointment is categorized into two stages, an 
initial ACR stage and a close ACR stage to differentiate 
an ability of auditor to withstand independence when a 
tenure of auditor reappointment increases consecutively. 
At the initial ACR stage, auditor reappointment represents 
a new relationship, and both manager and auditor are 
considered to begin understanding and familiarizing 
themselves with one another. The evidence shows that both 
parties behave well during the initial relationship stage 
by limiting high-risk decisions. The finding is consistent 
with our expectation that auditors exhibit scepticism and 
professionalism at the initial ACR stage while managers 
are willing to cooperate with the auditors (Schmidt & 
Cross 2014). 
We also contribute empirical evidence on the above-
described relationship at the close ACR stage. Auditors who 
have been reappointed for several consecutive years may 
denote a close ACR. While managers are typically more 
demanding, auditors are expected to be more willing to 
compromise ethical principles (Schmidt & Cross 2014). 
The finding supports Gordon et al. (2007) in which we show 
that managers may opportunistically utilize established 
close ACRs as incentives to set arrangements with related 
parties. The magnitude of RPT increases as consecutive 
tenure relationships continue, suggesting that the managers 
may intentionally reappoint the same auditors for RPTs. 
Our study also integrates a function of Big 4 audit firms 
as independence with high quality monitoring entities for 
RPTs to a network relationship that raises potential conflicts 
of interest. Overall, the evidence recommends that Big 4 
audit firms can withstand independence to substantially 
reduce company engagement in RPTs, even when they 
have close ACR. However, only evidence derived from 
RPT companies (excluding non-RPT companies) suggests 
that there is likelihood of Big 4 audit firms to encourage 
company’s engagement in RPTs at the close ACR stage. 
Policy makers and regulators are recommended to 
revisit a mandatory auditor rotation policy, specifically for 
companies that are engaged in high risk contract involving 
related parties. Recurring auditor reappointments over 
several consecutive years are predicted to build up 
networks and form close relationships and generate future 
commitments (de-Ruyter & Wetzels 1999). The auditors’ 
capacities to withstand independence and remain sceptical 
in negotiating specific issues may be compromised as a 
result of close relationships (Beattie et al. 2004; Schmidt 
& Cross 2014). 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: 
Section 2 presents background information on East Asia, 
ACR and RPTs, and Section 3 discusses the literature 
review, theory and the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the 
research design and Section 5 reports the empirical results. 
The last section discusses and concludes the findings.  
THE LANDSCAPE OF EAST ASIA, ACR AND RPTS
East Asian countries, specifically Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand, are very important economically 
and use similar equity capital structures. Most of the 
listed companies are typically dominated by controlling 
shareholders through block or concentrated ownership 
(Claessens et al. 2000), particularly by a family (Villalonga 
& Amit 2006). Controlling shareholders also typically 
occupy key managerial positions, and founders and/or 
their family members often assume upper management 
positions in these controlled companies (Munir et al. 
2013; Wiwattanakantang 2001). This ownership structure 
encourages controlling shareholders or managers to enter 
contract arrangements with related parties, specifically 
among families. In addition, controlling shareholders 
may enjoy substantial controlling ownership over other 
entities or affiliates in groups. The dominant control 
structure creates opportunities for firms to address 
related members through controlled entities or affiliates, 
especially when some entities complement or exist to 
support the operations of others (Thomas, Herrmann 
& Inoue 2004). Thus, RPTs are prevalent among group 
companies in inefficient markets of East Asia (Bae, Baek, 
Kang & Liu 2012). RPTs serve as an alternative market 
where controlling shareholders can effectively use inter-
groups transactions to maximize capital resources, to 
secure business opportunities, and to secure financial 
support from the group when outsource funding is difficult 
to obtain (Khanna & Palepu 1997). RPTs can be used to 
improve business and communication efficiency levels, to 
establish business networks, to reduce uncertainties and 
to save transactional costs for all group companies due to 
external market inefficiencies (Khanna & Palepu 2000).
However, these affiliations formed under the umbrella 
of common ownership can be exploited, as the structure 
allows controlling shareholders or managers to engage in 
RPTs to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders 
(OECD 2009). They also can employ the prospect of 
incomplete information in external markets due to 
information asymmetries that help with ways of disclosing, 
hiding or manipulating RPTs through financial reporting. 
For example, opportunist controlling shareholders reap 
private gains from using RPTs by making improper cash 
or debt transfers, by purchasing assets at inflated prices, 
and by securing outright bailouts for failing subsidiaries 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). The expropriation problem is 
likely to be more severe in companies where controlling 
shareholders also occupy management teams (Bebchuk, 
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Kraakman & Triantis 2000). Thus, the internal markets of 
group companies may increase the number of abusive RPTs 
(Jian & Wong 2010). Additionally, since the 1997/1998 
Asian Financial crisis, the emerging economies of East 
Asia have been notorious for exhibiting poor corporate 
governance, regulatory frameworks and weak level of 
minority shareholders’ right enforcement (Mitton 2002) 
which created a conducive business landscape that renders 
RPTs inevitable (Villalonga & Amit 2006). 
Minority shareholder protection mechanisms in East 
Asian countries may improve following amendments 
or the issuance of acts or regulations. Each East Asian 
country has strengthened corporate governance practices 
by establishing institutions and by introducing and 
promoting the best practice code on corporate governance. 
A broad range of laws and regulations have been enacted; 
financial reporting standards have been developed, and 
the enforcement perspective has been strengthened 
(Abdul-Wahab, Haron, Lok & Yahya 2011). The Stock 
Exchanges in East Asia also stress that every RPT is 
required to grant a general mandate of approval from 
shareholders as well as thresholds to be disclosed. While 
soliciting shareholder approval, the interested party and 
any associate of the interested party cannot vote on the 
RPT resolution. Central minority shareholder groups 
such as The Minorities Shareholders Watchdog Group in 
Malaysia and Singapore’s Securities Investors Association 
are established to provide advisory to investors. 
Mandatory rotations are proposed as a means of 
improving auditor independence and audit quality levels 
by limiting frequent interactions between managers and 
auditors. There are two forms of auditor rotation: partner 
rotation and audit firm rotation. Although the mandatory 
rotation is recommended, many East Asian countries 
prefer longer periods between rotations. Hong Kong, 
Malaysia and Singapore do not require audit firm rotations 
and instead require audit partners to be rotated for every 
five years. In Japan, no rotation requirements are placed 
on audit firms or audit partners, while in China, both audit 
firms and audit partners must be rotated every five years. 
Only in Taiwan mandatory rotation rule requires audit 
partners to rotate every year. Most listed companies in 
these four countries studied have retained the audit firms 
in practice for more than six years (Abu Thahir, Wahid, 
Nazri & Hudaib 2006). 
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY AND  
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
ACR AND RECURRING AUDITOR REAPPOINTMENT
The concept of ACRs extends beyond the scope of buyer-
seller relationships documented in the marketing literature, 
as auditors are required to withstand independence from 
their clients (Kleinman & Palmon 2001). ACRs are not 
only restricted by guidelines and laws, and rationality 
and emotions cannot be separated as they are part of the 
human being’s experience, often complementing one 
another during decision-making (Monin, Pizarro & Beer 
2007). ACRs involve an exchange of interdependence 
where managers need audit services provided by auditors 
while auditors require audit fees from clients for business 
survival (Goldman & Barlev 1974; Nichols & Price 1976). 
ACRs also require cooperation and interaction, as auditors 
depend on clients for information while conducting audit 
work (de-Ruyter & Wetzels 1999). 
Past studies debated consequences of long tenure ACR 
from two opposite views. Proponents argue that long tenure 
ACRs can develop auditors’ client-specific knowledge, 
reduce a recurring client’s business understanding of 
costs and limit conflicts between managers and auditors 
(Levinthal & Fichman 1988). Auditors also benefit from 
learning curve effects through the detection of a material 
misstatement (DeAngelo 1981), while a new auditor 
can make more mistakes due to a lacking understanding 
of a client’s business (Vanstraelen 2000). On the other 
hand, opponents are more concerned that long tenure 
ACR impairs auditor independence and reduce audit 
quality levels. Close ACRs increase auditor loyalty to 
their clients (de-Ruyter & Wetzels 1999) and create 
economic dependence between auditors (Nichols & Price 
1976). Thus, the close ACR affects incumbent auditors’ 
complacency, limits innovativeness, and results in fewer 
rigorous audit procedures (Shockley 1982) and may be less 
sceptical and able to preserve a decline in independence 
over time (Whittington, Grout & Jewitt 1995). Some 
prior studies have evidence that long-tenure ACRs are 
associated with lower levels of conflict, disagreement 
between managers and auditors, and decrease a likelihood 
of auditors in issuing a qualified opinion (Levinthal 
& Fichman 1988). Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and 
Lapides (2000) also criticized that the auditor may choose 
to cooperate with a client’s decision to conceal an abusive 
RPT. Opportunistic managers can misuse the established 
network with repeatedly reappointed auditors and put 
pressure on auditors to meet their needs (Schmidt & 
Cross 2014). 
RPTS AND EXPROPRIATION IN EAST ASIA
RPTs have received considerable attention since they were 
used as expropriation tools in many global corporate 
collapses (Munir et al. 2013). RPTs are a normal course 
of business in which they are frequently maintained 
through subsidiaries, joint ventures, associates or affiliates 
(Thomas et al. 2004). Two views on RPTs due to nature 
and complexities of RPTs can be utilized either efficiently 
or opportunistically. The efficient views suggest that 
RPTs can reduce costs, improve efficiency levels (Jian & 
Wong 2010), and help companies meet their economic 
and financial goals (Gordon et al. 2007). For example, 
managers can ensure an efficiency of the company’s 
daily business operation by buying raw materials from 
subsidiaries at a lower cost than the market price. 
Managers also can utilize RPT to allocate resources for 
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helping subsidiaries that experienced financial difficulty 
(Khanna & Palepu 1997). RPTs are also legal agreements 
and not necessarily indicate that a company engages in 
greater earnings management or fraudulent reporting to 
deceive investors (Gordon et al. 2007). 
By contrast, the conflict of interest view argues that 
RPTs increase the probability of aggressive accounting in 
which affect earnings quality (Sherman & Young 2001). 
Managers and controlling shareholders can manipulate 
a term of a transaction and disclosure for personal gains 
due to an information asymmetry. The conflict of interests 
are hidden behind RPTs among affiliates or subsidiaries 
that they hold duality ownership in both entities. RPT 
may be seen efficient to the company but with a duality 
ownership the managers or controlling shareholders may 
increase own wealth. Many prior studies support that RPTs 
are used as tunneling tools to transfer assets and profits 
away from companies to the benefit of those who control 
them (Cheung, Jing, Lu, Rau & Stouraitis 2009; Gordon, 
Henry & Palia 2004).  
Nevertheless, an underlying reason of RPT’s 
commitment is difficult to be identified (Louwers, Henry, 
Reed & Gordon 2008) either to represent efficient or 
conflict of interest, particularly at international level due to 
different requirements and standards for RPT’s disclosure. 
RPTs have caused many audit failures (Beasley et al. 2000). 
Considering the nature of RPTs as a normal business 
transaction, legal and soundly efficient for company’s 
daily operation, complex and gives privilege to violate 
arm’s length assumption (agreed at a lower or higher than 
the market price), RPTs are opportunistic contracts.
INITIAL AND CLOSE STAGES OF ACRS AND RPTS 
IN EAST ASIA
The ACR does not simply emerge. Rather, it evolves 
through a process over time. Such process involves 
establishing, developing and maintaining successful 
relationships (Morgan & Hunt 1994). Scanzoni (1979) 
described the process as involving five phases, i.e., 
awareness, exploration, expansion, commitment and 
dissolution. During the awareness phase, both parties 
strive to secure a position in the best possible way in order 
to increase levels of attraction between one another. After 
the awareness phase is the exploration phase, where both 
parties become acquainted with one another by considering 
ACR requirements, benefits and burdens and start-up costs, 
which are relatively high in the audit services market. The 
relationship remains fragile, can be easily terminated as 
no major investment has been made and interdependence 
is not yet achieved (de-Ruyter & Wetzels 1999). These 
two phases are referred to as reappointment phases after 
the first year of relations (Dwyer, Schurr & Oh 1987). At 
this initial stage, the auditor will minimize audit risks, 
avoid unethical conduct and complete work according 
to audit guidelines and requirements. By contrast, the 
manager respects the auditor and is willing to cooperate 
by being less demanding. The expansion phase refers to 
the continual increase in benefits to be obtained; both 
parties begin to trust one another more and become 
satisfied with the relationship. During the commitment 
phase, both parties have achieved a level of satisfaction 
from the relationship, which is the most desirable one 
in the development of an ongoing ACR (Dwyer et al. 
1987). The final phase is dissolution, whereby one party 
begins to evaluate his or her dissatisfaction with the other 
party of dissolution (de-Ruyter & Wetzels 1999) due to 
disagreements or regulatory reasons. 
The ACR involves a continuation process, and such 
a relationship develops considerably (close) during the 
commitment phase in which is developed concurrently 
with increase in a tenure of engagement. Reappointment 
is done by managers once they are satisfied with the 
auditors’ working behaviours and services rendered 
(Öhman, Häckner & Sörbom 2012), thus increase the 
audit engagement tenure (Beattie & Fearnley 1998). As the 
reappointment tenure becomes longer, the interpersonal 
relationship becomes stronger between managers and 
audit firms (Meyer et al. 2007) and managers and audit 
partners (Ball, Tyler & Wells 2015). Thus, the close ACR 
can develop trust resulting in hassle-free and efficient 
audit engagements and increased efficiency. Within this 
context, managers’ intention to reappoint the same auditors 
for a subsequent audit can be considered as an initiative 
to form the close ACR.
By contrast, managers may also reappoint the auditors 
in consecutive long tenure to get their objectives realized 
in later years since the decision to terminate and continue 
relationship is in their hands (Bennouri, Nekhili & Touron 
2015). Managers can easily convince the auditor to 
accept managers’ preferred treatment (Kerler & Brandon 
2010) when they have gained trust from the auditors. 
The close ACR, which is acquired through a long tenure 
reappointment (Reheul, Caneghem & Verbruggen 2013) 
may cause auditors to become less sceptical 44 (Baker 
& Al-Thuneibat 2011). The opportunistic managers may 
use the close relationship to maximize personal gains by 
engaging in contracts through RPTs. Managers can also 
use a personal relationship through past experiences and 
informal ties (Waresul, van_Zijl & Mollah 2013) as well 
as degrees of chemistry in their personal relationships 
(Beattie & Fearnley 1998) as a basis for reappointing the 
same auditors. Thus, it is crucial to understand managers 
incentives to retain the same audit firms over several 
consecutive years. Do such processes occur coincidentally 
or are they intentionally planned? 
The quality of the ACR is vital when determining 
an auditor’s ability to monitor manager engagement in 
RPT activities (Meyer et al. 2007). Auditors are required 
to be more sensitive to any indicators that may result in 
RPT activities. However, RPT auditing is not an easy task, 
as when ascertaining undisclosed RPTs, opportunistic 
managers may intentionally prevent RPTs from being 
audited (Gordon et al. 2007). Therefore, auditors must 
be equipped with sufficient knowledge and experience to 
allow them to be more sceptical of RPT indicators. 
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Consistent with theory, ACRs involve a continuation 
process, the relationship is fragile at the initial stage 
and strong relationships are considered to exist during 
the commitment stage. At the initial stage, relationships 
are considered delicate and both parties are working to 
understand one another. The auditors will conduct audit 
work purely consistent with auditing requirements. By 
contrast, managers cooperate with the auditors’ requests 
to comply with financial reporting standards and place 
few pressures on the auditors (Schmidt & Cross 2014). 
Auditors are required to review RPTs every year when 
auditing company’s financial statements. At this initial ACR 
stage, the auditors are expected to have familiarity with 
the clients and prefer to withstand independence and avoid 
violating auditing requirement standard. The auditors can 
play monitoring role in preventing abusive contract during 
initial ACR stage, including RPTs from manifesting. As a 
result, RPTs and any indicator of undisclosed RPTs will 
be audited thoroughly, which will reduce magnitude of 
RPTs, particularly the abusive. We develop the following 
hypothesis (H1) to confirm that at the initial stage ACR 
magnitude of RPTs would be minimized.
H1  During the initial ACR stage, auditor reappointment 
is negatively related to RPTs
Recurring auditor appointments in many consecutive 
years allow auditors to acquire specific client knowledge 
and to thus produce high quality audits (Myers et al. 2003). 
By contrast, retaining the same auditors in long tenure ACR 
will cause auditors to become empathetic towards client’s 
companies and poor judgment (Dao & Pham 2014; Meyer 
et al. 2007). When the ACR reaches the commitment (close) 
stage, levels of negotiation power may be influenced by 
interdependencies between both parties that typically 
favour managers (Nichols & Price 1976). Major concerns 
centre on the argument that close ACRs cause auditors to 
prioritize client demands over stakeholders’ interests. 
Managers also can influence auditors’ judgment by 
offering recurring appointments over several consecutive 
years and/or by offering non-audit service portfolios 
(Beattie et al. 2004; Meyer et al. 2007). 
Schmidt and Cross (2014) depict that auditor 
negotiation strategies change when the ACR is extended. 
Managers are more demanding and employ stronger 
strategies during negotiations that can influence and 
dominate auditors. Auditors may not be able to efficiently 
prevent the occurrence of abusive RPTs. This conclusion 
is consistent with theories and prior studies, including 
Schmidt and Cross (2014) who state that managers use 
contentious approaches to get their views accepted. While 
predicting magnitude of RPTs increases in long tenure ACR, 
hypothesis H2 is developed to confirm a direct relationship 
between close ACRs and RPTs. 
H2 During the close ACR stage, auditor reappointments 
occurring over several consecutive years are 
positively related to RPTs
RECURRING REAPPOINTMENTS OF BIG 4 AUDIT FIRMS 
AND RPTS IN EAST ASIA
Several prior studies show that Big 4 audit firms are likely 
more capable of monitoring RPTs activities. Gallery et al. 
(2008) and Gul et al. (2010) show that Big 4 audit firms 
play a significant governance role in reducing the number 
of RPTs and converted RPTs with potentials to become 
abusive in facilitating efficient transactions. However, 
these prior findings disregard the existence of close ACR, 
which may impair auditor independence. This argument 
is aligned with Almutairi, Dunn and Skantz (2009) in 
that information asymmetries and audit tenure involve 
a U-shaped process where information asymmetries are 
more pronounced during the first year of engagement, 
decrease during initial years and increase over longer 
periods of tenure. 
Existing evidence supports the fact that ACRs become 
stronger when managers reappoint the same auditors over 
several consecutive years. Close relationships involving 
higher levels of trust and commitment between auditors 
and managers may exacerbate information asymmetries. 
When the trust element evolves, auditors may apply less 
scepticism while conducting audit work (Luippold, Kida, 
Piercey & Smith 2015). We stress that the efficiency role 
of Big 4 audit firms in the context of close relationships 
stage resulting from recurring reappointments over 
several consecutive years has remained unexplored. 
Close ACR due to long tenure are likely to compromise 
auditor’s scepticism attitudes despite the efficiency of Big 
4, specifically to negotiate specific issues such as RPTs 
(Beattie et al. 2004; Schmidt & Cross 2014). Thus, we 
present the following hypothesis:
H3 During the close ACR stage, recurring auditor 
reappointments over several consecutive years from 
Big 4 audit firms are positively related to RPTs
RESEARCH DESIGN
The sample consists of companies listed in Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand from 2008 to 2010. 
Hong Kong and Singapore represent superior minority 
shareholder protection and higher governance quality 
while Malaysia and Thailand represent relatively poor 
regulatory regimes (World Bank 2012). However, we 
acknowledge that these four countries have been advanced 
in terms of implementing and reforming corporate 
governance practices and various company related statutes 
over the last decade relative to other East Asian countries. 
Thus, a quality of reporting standards should be higher and 
more reliable. Crucially, the majority of companies listed 
in these four countries publish annual reports in English 
because we have to collect data manually from annual 
company reports. Additionally, audit firms and auditors’ 
rotation policy in these selected countries has never been 
changed since it was implemented until nowadays. Also, 
there is no major regulation on RPTs implemented since 
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2007. Thus, we argue that the data is relevant to show the 
current predicted relationships. Some non-financial data 
on archive corporate governance structures, ownership 
structures and audit quality levels were also collected 
manually from the annual reports. We collected additional 
annual company reports for 2002 to 2007 to assess the 
number (tenure) of recurring and consecutive years during 
which auditors had been reappointed. 
A database was screened to exclude companies without 
a complete set of required annual reports and financial 
institutions due to different regulatory requirements. From 
the available database, the companies were ranked by 
average company size for the prior three years and roughly 
one-third of the data for each country were selected via 
stratified random sampling. This procedure rendered 
the sample representative, including a balanced number 
of large and small companies. We identified 423 listed 
companies over the three-year period and collected a total 
of 1,269 observations, involving four major industries, i.e., 
manufacturing, retail, service, and property companies. 
We omitted a few observations due to the presence of 
incomplete information, producing a final sample of 1220 
observations. We created another sub-sample of companies 
that disclosed RPTs in annual reports during the period, 
generating a total of 783 observations. The sub-sample 
was aligned with our objective to investigate whether RPTs 
whereby companies that reappointed the same auditors 
over several consecutive years were associated with the 
intention to engage in RPTs. In turn, we avoided potential 
confounding effects of non-RPTs companies. 
We used a pooled regression to examine the 
hypotheses. The regression models are as follows: 
RPTsi,t = β0 + β1ReAppi,t + β2RecReAppi,t + β3AudQi,t 
+ β4AOPINi,t + β5GROWTHi,t + β6SIZEi,t 
+ β7LEVi,t + β8BDSIZEi,t + β9BDINDi,t 
+β10ACINDi,t + β11CSi,t + β12CSFi,t +β13RISKi,t 







i,j Countryi,t + εi,t           (1) 
RPTsi,t = β0 + β1ReAppi,t + β2RecReAppi,t + 
β3RecReAppi,t*Big4i,t + β4AOPINi,t + 
β5GROWTHi,t + β6SIZEi,t + β7LEVi,t + 
β8BDSIZEi,t + β9BDINDi,t +β10ACINDi,t + 








 + εi,t                (2)
In the models, RPTsi,t is a vector describing an 
abnormal magnitude of total RPTs. ReAppi,t denotes a 
binary variable representing auditor reappointment, value 
equals to “1” if a company reappoints the same auditor or 
“0” if a company switches the auditor. RecReAppi,t is the 
actual number of consecutive years during which audit 
firms were reappointed after the first year of engagement. 
RecReAppi,t*B4i,t is the actual number of consecutive years 
during which Big 4 audit firms were reappointed after 
the first year of engagement. AudQi,t is a binary variable 
representing an audit quality, value equals to “1” if a firm 
is audited by the Big 4 or “0” if otherwise. AOPINit is an 
indicator variable, equals to one if an auditor issued a clean 
audit opinion and zero otherwise. GROWTHi,t is a company’s 
market value at the end of a year t divided by book value 
of total assets. SIZEi,t is a natural logarithm of a company’s 
total assets. LEVi,t is the ratio of total debt over total assets. 
BDSIZEi,t is the board size based on the actual number of 
directors. BDINDi,t is the proportion of independent non-
executive directors to total board members. ACINDi,t is the 
proportion of independent non-executive members to total 
members on an audit committee. CSi,t is a percentage of 
ownership belonging to a controlling shareholder. CSFi,t is 
a binary variable equals to “1” if a controlling shareholder 
is an individual or family group and “0” if otherwise. RISKi,t 
is an operating risk measured based on a three-year earning 
standard deviation. EQi,t is earnings quality measured based 
on discretionary accruals (modified Jones’s model). Yeari,t 
is a vector of year indicator variables for 2008, 2009, and 
2010. Indi,t is a vector of industry indicator variables based 
on the GICS industry classification. Countryi,t is a vector of 
country indicator variables. εi,t is the error term.
Equation 2 is developed to exclude AudQ as this 
variable is highly correlated with RecReApp*Big4 at 
roughly 0.80. We measure RPTs based on an abnormal 
magnitude of transactions in which the magnitude of 
RPTs minus the mean RPT value, which is determined 
by controlling the year, industry and country. Then, the 
abnormal magnitude is scaled by the starting total assets 
for each year. This centric measurement approach has 
been extended from prior studies, including Cheung, Rau, 
and Stouraitis (2006) and Jian and Wong (2010). The 
independent variable, which is the auditor reappointment 
(ReApp), refers to the reappointment of an auditor after 
the first year of engagement. Every observation at year 
t (2008, 2009 and 2010) is assumed as a second year 
after the first-year engagement. The previous year, t-1 is 
assumed as the first time the audit firms were appointed 
by the company. The measurement excludes the actual 
number of consecutive years during which auditor was 
reappointed. This assumption is vital to represent ReApp 
as the initial ACR stage. It is scaled by a dummy variable 
that is equal to one when a company reappoints an auditor 
and which is equal to zero when a company appoints a new 
auditor. Another independent testing variable, which is the 
auditor recurring reappointment (RecReApp), considers 
the tenure of an auditor who had been reappointed; this 
is measured based on the actual number of years during 
which an audit firm is employed by a firm in year t minus 
the first engagement year.  
We included control variables to represent company-
specific characteristics, corporate governance patterns, 
audit quality levels, ownership structures and earnings 
quality levels that may have an effect on a company’s 
involvement in RPTs. Cross-sectional differentials of 
company characteristics include the following: control 
through company growth (GROWTH), size (SIZE), leverage 
(LEV), operating risk (RISK) (Ahmed, Hossain & Adams, 
2006) and earnings quality (EQ) (Gaio & Raposo 2011). 
We controlled for audit quality (AudQ) (Gallery et al. 
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2008; Gul et al. 2010) and the types of audit opinions 
(AOPIN) expressed by auditors during a given period. We 
also controlled for cross-sectional differentials in corporate 
governance characteristics that may influence company RPT 
involvement, including board size (BSIZE) (Mohd-Saleh, 
Iskandar & Rahmat 2005), board independence (BDIND) 
(Gordon et al. 2004), audit committee independence 
(ACIND), controlling shareholders (CS)(Gordon et al. 2004), 
and types of controlling shareholders (CSF) (Munir et al. 
2013; Wiwattanakantang 2001). Consistent with cross-
country sectional pooled data, we included Year, Industry 
and Country indicators to control their differential effects 
(Mitton 2002). The detail measurements of these control 
variables are shown in Appendix A.
RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Panel A of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics based on 
all observations and only companies that disclosed RPTs, 
while Panel B of Table 1 presents frequency statistics for 
binary variables. Panel A of Table 1 shows that RPTs have 
a mean (median) value of -0.45 (-0.05) with a standard 
deviation of 1.19. The mean (median) value of RPTs 
reaches -0.56 (-0.08) with a standard deviation of 1.38 
for RPT companies only. Excluding non-RPT companies 
from the sample removes 11% percent [-0.56-(-0.45)] of 
the RPT mean value, which is considered significant in 
interpreting the findings. The standard deviation for all 
of the variables is considered to be small, suggesting that 
the data are not widely dispersed. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents a frequency of auditor 
reappointment (ReApp) with 1,200 observations, which 
represents 94.8% of companies that reappointed the same 
auditors for audit engagements in subsequent years. The 
table also shows 763 (94.2%) observations of reappoint of 
the same auditors for the subsequent engagement among 
RPT companies. In addition, Panel A of Table 1 shows that 
the companies reappoint the same audit firms for several 
consecutive years and for more than five years on average. 
The mean and median values for RecReApp are 5.56 (6.00) 
and 5.43 (6.00), respectively. These statistics indicate in 
average that the companies retained the same audit firms 
for more than five years, which may be associated with 
intentions to establish close relationships. These statistics 
are consistent with a study by Abu Tahir et al. (2006) that 
found majority companies in Malaysia retained the same 
auditors for more than five years.
Table 1 also shows that the mean, median and standard 
deviations for the control variables do not indicate that 
the data are widely dispersed. The Pearson’s correlation 
matrix for companies that disclose RPTs (not tabulated) 
suggests that there is no indication that unreasonably high 
correlations are present among the independent variables. 
These values suggest that there is no a harmful level of 
multicollinearity (Neter, Wasserman & Kutner 1983).
TABLE 1. Descriptive analysis
 All Samples RPT Companies Only
Panel A: Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev.
RPTs -0.45 -0.05 1.33 -7.84 1.19 -0.56 -0.08 1.33 -7.84 1.38
RecReApp 5.56 6.00 8.00 0.00 2.35 5.43 6.00 8.00 0.00 2.43
GROWTH 0.73 0.48 6.09 0.05 0.86 0.75 0.49 6.09 0.05 0.90
LEV 0.15 0.12 0.60 0.00 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.60 0.00 0.14
BDSIZE 9.04 9.00 18.00 4.00 3.03 9.39 9.00 18.00 4.00 2.93
BDIND 0.43 0.40 0.82 0.17 0.13 0.42 0.40 0.82 0.17 0.13
ACIND 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.15 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.14
CS 0.36 0.33 0.85 0.04 0.18 0.34 0.30 0.85 0.04 0.18
RISK 9.34 9.21 13.84 5.82 1.75 9.29 9.16 13.84 5.82 1.76
EQ 0.08 0.05 0.87 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.65 0.00 0.08
Panel B: Frequency Frequency
ReApp 1,200 (94.8%) 763 (94.2%)
AudQ 929 (73.2%) 584 (71.8%)
AOPIN 1,217 (95.9%) 781 (96.1%)
CSF 548 (43.3%) 343 (42.4%)
Notes: Variables are defined in Appendix A. Year, Industry and Country variables are not reported for brevity.
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MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS
Table 2 shows our results on the association between 
auditor reappointment (ReApp) and recurring auditor 
reappointment (RecReApp) with the abnormal RPTs. 
Panel A of Table 2 shows the results derived for the 
whole sample, while Panel B depicts the results for the 
RPT companies. Model 1 in Panel A of Table 2 shows 
that ReApp has a significant negative relationship with 
abnormal RPTs (the coefficient is -0.27 (t = -3.3; p < 
0.01)1), supporting the hypothesis. The adjusted R2 of 
the model is 33.2%. This result indicates that during the 
initial ACR stage, when audit firms are first reappointed 
for another annual contract, auditors are highly efficient 
at limiting company involvement in RPTs. 
We found that RecReApp has a significant and 
positive association with abnormal RPTs as predicted. 
The coefficient is 0.03 (t = 2.6), significant at the p < 
0.01 level. This result indicates that the magnitude of RPTs 
increases with ACR length. This suggests that recurring 
auditor appointments over several consecutive years may 
be related to managers’ intentions to engage in RPTs. The 
coefficients of other control variables (AudQ, GROWTH, 
SIZE, LEV, CSF, and RISK) are positive while AOPIN, BDIND, 
BSIZE, BDIND, CS and EQ are negative, justifying the 
need to control their effects on company involvement in 
RPTs prior to examining the effects of recurring auditor 
appointment. 
Model 2 in Panel A of Table 2 shows the RecReApp* 
Big4 results, or interactions between RecReApp and Big 
4 audit firms. In this regression model, we excluded a 
control variable, AudQ, as this variable is highly correlated 
with RecReApp*Big4 at roughly 0.80. The adjusted R2 is 
33.1% accurate at explaining the predicted relationship. 
The results show that the associations between ReApp 
and RecReApp and abnormal RPTs are consistent with the 
results obtained from Model 1. The coefficients are almost 
the same -0.28 (t = -3.4) and 0.04 (t = 3.1), respectively, 
at a significance level of p < 0.01). The most crucial is 
the findings pertaining to the fact the RecReApp*Big4 
coefficient is negative (-0.01; t = -2.6) and also significant 
at p < 0.01. The directions and significance level of all of 
the control variables are consistent with Model 1. These 
results indicate that recurring auditor reappointments 
from Big 4 audit firms effectively limit company’s RPT 
engagement. This evidence suggests that Big 4 audit 
firms can maintain independence while keeping the 
close relationships healthy, thus playing a vital role in 
discouraging RPTs (and mainly abusive ones).
TABLE 2. The results of the association between auditor reappointment and RPTs
 Panel A Panel B
 Whole Samples (n = 1,231) RPT Companies (n = 783)
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Variables Coefficient (t-Stat) Coefficient (t-Stat) Coefficient (t-Stat) Coefficient (t-Stat)
Constant -4.45 (-20.2)*** -4.50 (-20.7)*** -6.03 (-21.7)*** -6.11 (-21.7)***
ReApp -0.27 (-3.3)*** -0.28 (-3.4)*** -0.43 (-5.1)*** -0.47 (-7.0)***
RecReApp 0.03 (2.6)*** 0.04 (3.1)*** 0.03 (2.4)** 0.05 (3.0)***
RecReApp*B4  -0.01 (-2.6)***  0.01 (2.2)**
AudQ 0.07 (6.5)***   0.15 (5.3)***  
AOPIN -0.07 (-2.9)*** -0.07 (-2.0)** -0.06 (-0.9) -0.03 (-0.4)
GROWTH 0.04 (4.4)*** 0.04 (4.4)*** -0.01 (-0.9) -0.02 (-2.6)***
SIZE 0.36 (15.0)*** 0.36 (15.2)*** 0.47 (21.6)*** 0.48 (22.1)***
LEV 0.38 (2.6)*** 0.37 (2.5)*** 0.38 (2.7)*** 0.35 (2.2)**
BDSIZE -0.04 (-5.0)*** -0.04 (-5.1)*** -0.01 (-2.9)*** -0.02 (-4.7)***
BDIND -0.74 (-25.6)*** -0.75 (-21.9)*** -0.66 (-5.6)*** -0.81 (-4.8)***
ACIND -0.07 (-0.6) -0.07 (-0.5) -0.20 (-0.9) -0.16 (-0.6)
CS -0.49 (-7.9)*** -0.48 (-7.9)*** -0.36 (-5.0)*** -0.12 (-1.5)
CSF 0.10 (2.3)** 0.10 (2.2)** 0.08 (1.5) 0.06 (1.2)
RISK 0.01 (4.7)*** 0.01 (4.4)*** 0.00 (0.1) -0.01 (-0.8)
EQ -0.50 (-4.0)*** -0.50 (-4.0)*** -0.94 (-3.4)*** -0.57 (-1.2)
Year Included Included Included Included
Industry Included Included Included Included
Country Included Included Included Included
Adj. R2 33.2% 33.1% 39.2% 34.7%
Notes: ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  Variables are defined in Appendix A. Year, Industry, 
 and Country variables are not reported for brevity.
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We exclude non-RPT companies to further investigate 
whether the above findings are affected by the inclusion 
of companies that did not disclose RPTs. The descriptive 
analysis shows that the non-RPT companies reduced the 
mean value of abnormal RPTs by roughly 11%, which is 
considered substantial. The results are shown in Panel 
B of Table 2 and the adjusted R2 values of Models 1 
and 2 are higher than those of the models on the whole 
samples (39.2% and 34.7%, respectively). The results 
of Model 1 are consistent with the results for the whole 
samples. The RecReApp coefficient is also similar: 0.03 
(t = 2.4) at a significance level of p < 0.05. By contrast, 
the coefficient for ReApp (-0.43 [t = -5.1]) significant at 
p < 0.01 is substantially larger than that for the whole 
samples. This finding strongly suggests that recurring 
auditor appointments over several consecutive years are 
effective at limiting RPTs. The ReApp and RecReApp 
results shown in Model 2 are also consistent, but the 
coefficients are larger compared to those of the whole 
sample. The coefficient for ReApp is -0.47 (t = -7.0), and 
the coefficient for RecReApp is 0.05 (t = 3.0), and both 
are significant at p < 0.01. 
By contrast, the RecReApp*Big4 coefficient is 
positive at 0.01 (t = 2.2) and is significant at p < 0.05. This 
contradictory result confirms that the negative relationship 
found for the whole samples is influenced by the presence 
of non-RPT companies. These results are considered 
accurate, as one-third of the sampled companies that had 
been audited by Big 4 audit firms were not engaged in or 
disclosed RPTs. Overall, Big 4 audit firms can maintain 
independence over long-term ACRs. However, Big 4 audit 
firms that had been reappointed over several consecutive 
years by RPT companies encouraged RPTs. This result 
confirms that close ACRs may limit auditor scepticism in 
evaluating RPTs. The contradictory results found for the 
whole samples substantially support our argument that 
managers intentionally reappoint auditors (including Big 
4 audit firms) to establish close relationships. 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS: REGULATORY REGIMES WITH 
GREATER MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
The tests were repeated by controlling for regulatory regime 
differentiation within the sampled countries. We created 
two groups based on the World Governance Indicator 
Index (World Bank 2012). Hong Kong and Singapore are 
represented by a dummy variable indicator (HProtect) 
equals to 1, as these countries exhibited superior minority 
shareholder protection measures and higher governance 
quality levels than Malaysia and Thailand, which were 
assigned a value of 0 for exhibiting poor regulatory 
regimes. The results were not tabulated but showed that 
RecReApp*HProtect and RecReApp*B4*HProtect have 
negative and significant associations for all of the company 
models and those for RPT company models. These results 
show that relationships between auditor reappointment 
in over many consecutive years, including by the Big 4 
audit firms and RPTs were attenuated in countries where 
minority shareholder protection is more effective and 
where more effective governance mechanisms are in place. 
These findings may confirm that the ability of managers 
to establish close networks of ACR for opportunistic 
purposes is prominent in countries presenting lower 
levels of shareholder protection, less effective corporate 
governance practices and lacking enforcement of 
implemented regulations. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study examines company behaviors in reappointing 
auditors over several consecutive years and RPTs, for four 
East Asian countries due to the dominance of family and 
concentrated ownership structures. Although the OECD and 
ASEAN countries have worked together by implementing 
several measures to improve governance mechanisms and 
have updated relevant regulatory provisions to reduce the 
opportunistic nature of RPTs, there is no specific provision 
discussing this issue from the perspective of tenure ACRs. 
While research on this issue referring to the East Asian 
region has been limited, this study fills the knowledge gap 
on this important research issue by investigating company 
auditor reappointment associations at two different stages 
(initial and close stages of ACRs) and RPTs for East 
Asian companies. The evidence shows that ReApp limits 
manager engagement in RPTs. This is consistent with the 
argument that during initial ACR stages, relationships are 
considered fragile and managers are more cooperative, 
as the auditor’s negotiation power is greater than that of 
the client (Schmidt & Cross 2014). It supports that audits 
conducted by Big 4 audit firms effectively minimize the 
number of RPTs, can maintain independence and remain 
healthy relationships. 
The findings are robust for both models and samples, 
suggesting that close ACR stages (RecReApp) increase 
manager dealings with related parties. The evidence 
is in support of Gordon et al. (2007) that companies 
involved in RPTs - especially the abusive- maintain close 
relationships and networks with the auditors. Managers 
may intentionally establish close ACRs by reappointing 
auditors on a continual basis in order to reduce auditor 
scepticism and the questioning of company incentives 
while carrying out RPTs (Schmidt & Cross 2014). 
Managers can select favoured auditors from their 
established close networks in which provide managers 
with choices, however auditors can be influenced by. 
While close ACR may impair an auditor’s ethical judgment, 
the implementation of RPTs and reporting requirements 
may be easily agreed upon by auditors. This supports 
the contention that recurring auditor appointments over 
several consecutive years are opportunistically used to 
support RPT implementation. 
The findings also show that close ACRs from Big 4 
audit firms can play a significant role in limiting RPTs. 
This suggests that close ACRs do not necessarily generate 
conflicts of interest. Some auditors from Big 4 audit firms 
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conduct professional works objectively and independently 
to uphold their reputations. These individuals resist being 
influenced by pressures from managers despite being 
reappointed over several consecutive years. However, for 
those companies that were engaged in RPTs, the findings 
empirically show that the close ACR from Big 4 audit 
firms encourages companies to engage in RPTs. This is 
concerning, as such auditors may become complacent and 
may lack scepticism in querying RPTs, specifically given 
that such transactions are likely to be abused. The above 
findings contribute substantially to the literature as the 
first study to date that provides empirical evidences on the 
relationship between ACR (at initial and close ACR stages) 
and RPTs. However, implications of recurring auditor 
appointments over several consecutive years among Big 4 
audit firms can be generalized to two perspectives. Under 
certain circumstances, when Big 4 audit firms have the 
incentive and capacity to maintain independence, close 
relationships are considered healthy. In contrast, such 
relationships may be considered unhealthy when an 
auditor enters a conflict of interest due to his failure to 
respond to a client’s influence. Nevertheless, ACR involves 
human being relationship which is difficult to judge the 
healthier level of the relationship, creating a big challenge 
for future researches.
Our samples present some limitations that may affect 
our findings. The abnormal RPTs were determined based 
on information disclosed in annual company reports but 
there is possibility that companies engaged in RPTs may 
not have disclosed such transactions. RPT companies 
also did not disclose market prices on the reported RPTs, 
and thus abusive RPTs are related to potential effects 
and not to actual tunneling processes. We limited our 
conclusions on initial ACRs, as our measurements were 
assessed by excluding the actual number of years during 
which auditors were reappointed. We were also unable 
to simply interpret close ACR as Big 4 firms and RPTs 
present negative impressions due to the difficulty to judge 
when RPTs are abused. Auditors from Big 4 audit firms 
can also evade firm policy and reputation incentives and 
maintain independence while being reappointed through 
long-tenure ACRs. 
Our findings imply that managers, particularly the 
opportunistic managers gain more advantages from close 
ACR in which they can manipulate the relationship for 
fulfilling their personal interests. This circumstance urges 
policy makers to revisit existing auditor rotation policies. 
Close ACR should be carefully considered, specifically 
with regards to companies that engage with any high risk 
contract such as RPTs. It seems likely that close ACRs can 
be used opportunistically by companies as tools to engage 
in RPTs, which can harm shareholder interests. Close ACRs 
with strong networks provide managers with choices that 
allow them to place pressures on auditors. Interdependence 
auditors can in turn be influenced, potentially limiting 
their degree of scepticism and independence. As a result, 
managers can easily engage in any desired contract. Thus, 
the mandatory rotation policy should not focus only on 
auditors but should also focus on the design of the rotation 
policy to minimize managers’ opportunity in threatening 
the auditors. 
ENDNOTE
We report t-Statistics based on White’s (1980) consistent 
estimator.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX A. Variable definitions & measurements
 Variables  Explanation
RPTs An abnormal magnitude of RPTs; the magnitude of RPTs minus the mean RPT value, which is determined by 
controlling the year, industry and country. The abnormal magnitude is scaled by the beginning total assets for 
each year.
ReApp Auditor reappointment; the auditor is reappointed for a subsequent audit engagement after the first year of 
engagement. Dummy variable, coded 1 if the auditor is reappointed, and 0 if the company switches the auditor.
RecReApp Auditor recurring reappointment; an actual number of consecutive years during which auditors are reappointed 
after the first year of engagement.
RecReApp*B4 Auditor recurring reappointment in which define as an actual number of consecutive years during which Big 4 
audit firms are reappointed after the first year of engagement. 
HProtect A binary variable representing a high protection country, value equal to “1” if a company is operated in 
Singapore or Hong Kong, or “0” otherwise.
AudQ A binary variable representing an audit quality, value equal to “1” if a firm is audited by the Big 4 or “0” 
otherwise.
AOPIN An indicator variable equal to one if an auditor issued a clean audit opinion and zero otherwise.
GROWTH Company’s growth calculated as a market value of a company at the end of a year t, which is divided by book 
value of total assets (Collins & Kothari 1989).
SIZE Natural log of a company’s total assets.
LEV Leverage measured as a ratio of total debt over total assets.
BDSIZE Board size based on the actual number of directors.
BDIND Board independence measured as a proportion of independent non-executive directors to total board members.
ACIND Audit committee independence calculated by a proportion of independent non-executive members to total 
members on the audit committee.
CS A percentage of ownership belonging to a controlling shareholder.
CSF A binary variable equal to “1” if a controlling shareholder is an individual or family group and “0” otherwise.
RISK An operating risk measured based on a three-year earning standard deviation.
EQ Earnings quality measured based on discretionary accruals. The discretionary accruals are estimated using 
modified Jones’s model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney 1995). The procedures of partitioning component for firm 
i can be summarized as shown below:  
 TACCi, = NDACi, + DACi,, where TACC denotes total accruals, NDAC denotes non-discretionary accruals, and 
DAC denotes discretionary accruals. 
 Total accruals for a firm also can be computed as: TACCit, = EARNit, – OCFit, where EARN is income before 
extraordinary items and OCF is operating cash flows. 
 The DACit for firm i and time t is determined using the following equation: DACit(εit) = (TACCit/TAit-1) – {β1(1/
TAit-1) + β2(ΔREVit – ΔRECit)/TAit-1 +β3(ΔPPEit/TAit-1) where: TAit-1 denotes opening total assets, ΔREVit is the 
change in net for firm i in year t, PPEit denotes property plants and equipment for firm i in year t, ΔRECit 
denotes net receivables for firm i in year t minus net receivables in year t-1, and ε denotes prediction errors.
Year A vector of year indicator variables for 2008, 2009, and 2010.
Ind A vector of industry indicator variables based on the GICS industry classification.
Country A vector of country indicator variables i.e., Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.
‐ An error term.
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